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One of the main questions now at stake in the final phase of the negotiations on the Berlin
Mandate is whether or not the emission quotas specified in a protocol to the Climate
Convention should be tradeable. If a protocol allocates emission quotas to the Annex I
countries, governments of these countries might also want to consider allocating these quotas
further to domestic enterprises as emission permits. If such allocation takes place emission
trading is a significant policy option also in the domestic arenas. Hence, in the years to come,
new markets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission quotas and permits might emerge
domestically as well as internationally.
The aim of the report is to discuss the potential gains from emission trading and to raise
crucial questions. The advantages in the form of reduced abatement costs are a basic feature
of emission trading. The numerical example presented shows that the total abatement costs
within the Annex I area could be reduced by approximately 70% through emission trading.
From the Nordic perspective it is important to note that Denmark, Norway and Sweden are
probably among the Annex I countries benefiting most from this trading. Finland will not
benefit to the same extent from this trading because of lower estimated abatement costs in
this country.
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3The costsaving potentials are probably significant also with domestic emission trading. Here,
however, emission taxes could be implemented and give a correspondingly cost-effective
solution. It is also important to recall that an international trading scheme among
governments does not set restrictions on national choice of policy instruments.
The report emphasizes that emission trading at the national and international levels must be
discussed separately. The Nordic governments, for example, will find several good reasons
for supporting emission trading at the international level, although emission trading in
greenhouse gases may not be the preferred policy instrument domestically. The Nordic
countries have already implemented domestic taxes on CO2-emissions. This tax policy could
be sustained while the Nordic governments support and take part in emission trading at the
international level.
Even though we realize that emission trading can be in the interests of the Nordic countries,
some undesirable side effects cannot be ignored. The report emphasizes that a protocol with
low ambitions, could give at least some of the countries in transition to a market economy
(the EIT countries) emission limitations above their business-as-usual (BAU) emissions.
Free emission trading among Annex I countries would then reduce total emission abatement
compared to a situation where the quotas are non-tradeable. We will refer to this as the ‘hot
air’ problem in connection to emission trading.
The gains from trade
Figure 1 shows the calculated distribution of costs of a climate protocol.1  A protocol with
10% flat-rate emission reductions in 2010 relative to the 1990 emissions serves as our
starting point. The European Union (EU) has allocated its quota to the member countries in
accordance with the internal EU distribution plan agreed upon in March 1997.
Four cases are analyzed in the report. In the first case no emission trading is allowed. In the
second case only the Nordic countries are allowed to trade with each other. In the third
scenario, the trade region is extended to include all the Annex II countries. Finally, we look
at the case where emission trading is free within Annex I. In the last case the total costs of
                                                          
1
 The numerical examples are produced by simulation of a model developed at CICERO. The model is
described in detail in Holtsmark (1997).
4the Annex I countries are reduced by approximately 70% compared with the case without
trade.
Denmark, Norway, Japan, Sweden and the EIT countries will receive significant benefits
from emission trading. This is related to especially high or low abatement costs in these
countries. Countries with more average abatement cost patterns will not benefit to the same
extent from emission trading.
Figure 1 Costs of a climate protocol with 10% flat-rate CO2 emission reduction
commitments in 2010 relative to the 1990 emission levels. Both terms-of-trade
changes due to price changes in the energy markets and benefits from revenue
recycling are taken into account. The internal EU distribution plan agreed upon
in March 1997 is internalized.
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5A basic result of the presented model simulations is that the EIT countries are large quota
sellers, while in general the traditional market economies are buyers of quotas. Hence, if
there are no limitations on the trading, an outcome could be reduced abatement efforts in the
traditional market economies. Significant ‘no regret’ options for emission reductions in the
EIT countries mean that these countries experience net benefits even in a situation of no
emission trading.
Long-term impacts of emission trading
It is important to recall that the global emission reductions that could be achieved through a
protocol specifying emission limits only in the Annex I countries will be limited. The
emissions are likely to continue to grow in the rest of the world as long as new renewable
energy production loses in the competition with fossil fuels. Therefore, a crucial question is
how a climate agreement should be designed in order to encourage the technological
development within new renewable energy production. Emission trading reduces the costs of
emission abatement, which again will reduce the demand for non-polluting or emission
efficient technologies. Hence, emission trading could reduce the R&D incentives in these
areas, and consequently the long term environmental impacts of the agreement.
A stepwise approach to an emission trading scheme
The report recommends a controlled, step-by-step introduction of emission trading. The
seriousness of possible undesirable side effects will then probably be detected in time to be
corrected. The report distinguishes between three primary phases in the development of a
global emission trading scheme.
In the first phase a protocol or another legal instrument is established internationally. The
protocol quantifies emission limitations for the Annex I countries. In this phase the protocol
would allow limited trade in emission quotas between Annex I governments. For example,
each government is allowed to sell only a certain share of its quotas to other governments.
The rest of the quotas are non-tradeable. In order to avoid that quota trading leads to higher
emissions compared to a situation where the quotas are non-tradable, the size of the tradeable
share must be seen in relation to the ambition level. Furthermore, it would be best to allow
trade in emission quotas only for GHGs, or sources of GHG emissions, of which emissions
6are relatively easy to monitor and verify. An international institution should be designated to
approve, register and control the emission trading.
Some governments will design systems for domestic allocation of tradeable emission
permits. In the first phase the Nordic countries should consider whether they should continue
and expand their carbon-tax policies, or allocate tradeable quotas domestically. There are
good arguments for both alternatives. The report recommends, however, that the Nordic
countries should choose taxes, at least in the first phase.
At the end of the first phase, the Conference of the Parties (COP) should review experiences
from transboundary emission trading between governments of Annex I parties. On the basis
of this review the COP should decide whether the restrictions on the emission trading should
be relaxed.
If several governments in the first phase introduced emission-trading systems at the national
arenas, in the second phase they should consider whether these markets could be integrated.
Transboundary trade with both government and business could then emerge. The national
government, however, should be responsible for the national compliance. At this stage the
non-Annex I countries should be invited to accept emission limitations in order to be able to
join the quota market.
At the end of the second phase, the COP should evaluate the experiences. If they are
promising, a global market involving both governments and business in both Annex I and
non-Annex I countries could emerge in the third phase. The greatest benefits of the trading
regime are expected in in this phase.
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